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 Malpractice, Criminality and Medical Regulation: Reforming the Role of the GMC in Fitness to 
Practise Panels  
A recent Law Commission Review emphasised that medical fitness to practice panels (also called 
medical practitioners tribunals) are an important legal mechanism for ensuring that public trust in 
medical regulation is maintained when a complaint is made against a doctor. This paper examines 
trends over time in panel outcomes to identify their effectiveness in ensuring public protection. 
Although a rise in complaints, and a change from the criminal to civil standard of proof, has not led to 
more doctors being struck off the medical register, increasingly action is being taken to provide 
advice, issue warnings and agree rehabilitative forms of action with doctors. It is argued that these 
trends are congruent with the broader adoption of a risk-based approach to professional regulation. 
Legal reforms to maintain public trust must ensure that the shift towards risk-averse forms of 
professional accountability do not sacrifice public safety and due process for the sake of political 
pragmatic exigency. 
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The question of how best to legislate to protect the public in the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
ethically dubious, incompetent and criminal actions of doctors has long been of fundamental 
significance and interest to lawyers and beyond.1 However, over the last two decades in particular 
there has been heightened political, legal and public attention paid to the field of doctors’ fitness to 
practise as a result of a series of medical regulatory failings in prominent medical malpractice cases, 
such as the respective Bristol and Alder Hey cases, as well as medical acts of criminality, including 
multiple homicide in the case of the general practitioner Harold Shipman.2 In the UK, a doctor must be 
registered on the register of approved practitioners if they wish to practise medicine in the National 
Health Service (NHS). In 2015 they were 273 854 individuals registered on this database.3 The 
register is overseen by the General Medical Council (GMC) under the aegis of the Medical Act 1983. 
The GMC, therefore, represents the principal formal legal mechanism for medical regulation within the 
UK and is the statutory body responsible for responding to complaints about the fitness to practise of 
doctors.4 Only the GMC has the authority to remove doctors from the register by instigating 
disciplinary proceedings5 via what, since the end of December 2015, have been called Medical 
                                            
1 See C. A. Erin and S. Ost, The Criminal Justice System and Health Care (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); H, Biggs, Healthcare Research Ethics and Law: Regulation, Review and Responsibility 
(London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); M Brazier and D. Griffiths,’ Doctors in the Dock’ (2011) 
Manchester Memoirs, 148: 22 - 23; D. Griffiths and A. Sanders, Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal 
Law II: Medicine, Crime and Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); M. Brazier and 
S. Ost, Bioethics, Medicine and Criminal Law III: Medicine and Bioethics in the Theatre of the Criminal 
Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
2 K. Soothill and D. Wilson, 'Theorising the puzzle that is Harold Shipman' (2005) Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry and Psychology 16: 685 - 698. 
3 General Medical Council, List of Registered Medical Practitioners - Statistics. Available at: 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/doctors/register/search_stats.asp (Accessed 25th January 2016). 
4 H. Quirk, ‘Sentencing White Coat Crime: The Need for Guidance in Medical Manslaughter Cases’ 
(2013) Criminal Law Review 11: 871 - 888. 
5 The GMC is one of a number of bodies which deal with complaints against medical practitioners. 
NHS Hospital Trusts, Primary Care Trusts; alongside the National Clinical Assessment Service, the 
Healthcare Commission and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, are all important 
points of contact for dealing with medical malpractice and patient complaints. But the GMC remains 
Practitioners Tribunals (MPT).6  As a result, growing public and political concern with the regulation of 
doctors in light of a series of high-profile medical malpractice and negligence cases has focussed on 
the need to reform the organisational structure and operational culture of the GMC.7 In particular, 
attention has been paid to addressing the contention that the medical regulatory system in the UK has 
frequently served to mask medical mistakes rather than first and foremost protect the public interest.8  
This paper is concerned with key changes made to the MPT process as part of this reforming agenda. 
Inquiries of high profile scandals at Bristol Royal Infirmary, Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust and 
Morecombe Bay NHS Foundation Trust very publicly brought to the foreground questions about the 
willingness of a practitioner to report a colleague’s underperformance. They also reinforced to medical 
elites and NHS leaders the importance of, in principle, supporting reforms to medical regulatory and 
complaint processes.9 The Royal Colleges and British Medical Association collectively acknowledged 
that although (as they see it) some form of professionally-led regulatory process is necessary given 
the specialist nature of medical expertise, a more open and accountable system needs to be 
inculcated within the GMC and its day to day operation.10 Against this background, the paper critically 
examines the operation of the GMC complaints procedure and provides an analysis of statistical 
trends over time in the outcomes of MPTs to ascertain the impact of changes made, if any.  
Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008, the standard of evidence required to secure an impaired 
fitness to practise verdict and remove a practitioner from the medical register was reduced from a 
criminal to a civil standard of proof. This reform was justified on the grounds that, historically, the 
GMC had often been unable to remove a doctor from the medical register to protect the public, even 
when doubt existed over their clinical performance, because the standard of proof required was 
unduly high.11 A key concern here is that legal reforms have been introduced to the MPT process for 
reasons which might fail to fully account for the esoteric and situational nature of medical discretion 
when decisions are made, and as a result they may unintentionally serve, in particular types of cases, 
to undermine the principles of swift, proportionate and effective legal response(s) to ensure public 
protection.12 This is because, as the paper will discuss, bound up with the reforming regulatory 
agenda is the advocacy of a risk-based approach to professional regulation which possesses a 
tendency to seek to minimise clinical risk and cost through the transformation of medical work into a 
series of routine ‘step-by-step’ rules and procedures against which individual clinician performance 
can be measured and judged.13 Although a focus on minimising medical risk in this manner is 
understandable, the paper discusses how MPT outcome data supports the contention that risk-based 
regulation could be problematic as a model for governing professional forms of expertise.14 This 
                                            
the only body able to remove a doctor from the medical register and as a result stop them from 
practising medicine in the UK. 
6  Previously MPTs were referred to as Fitness to Practise Panels, which remains part of the 
regulatory socio-legal nomenclature.  
7 General Medical Council, Raising and Acting on Concerns about Patient Safety (London: GMC, 
2013). 
8 J. M. Chamberlain, The Sociology of Medical Regulation: An Introduction (Springer: New York and 
Amsterdam, 2012); P. Gooderham, ‘No-one Fully Responsible: A ‘Collusion of Anonymity’ Protecting 
Health-care Bodies from Manslaughter Charges?’ (2011) Clinical Ethics 6: 68 – 77.  
9 J.M. Chamberlain, Medical Regulation, Fitness to Practise and Medical Revalidation: A Critical 
Introduction (Bristol: Policy Press & Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) 
10 General Medical Council, Our Response to the Report of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry (London: GMC, 2013). 
11 P. Case, ‘Putting Public Confidence First: Doctors, Precautionary Suspension and the General 
Medical Council’ (2011) Medical Law Review 19: 339 - 371 
12 M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (Lexis-Nexis and Penguin, 2007). 
13 M. Power, Organised Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
14 The shift toward risk-based forms of regulation over the last decade has been noted as an 
emergent key feature of the governmental reform agenda within both law and medicine (for example, 
proposition is particularly prescient, it is argued, in light of the highly politicised nature of the legal 
regulation of doctors, and given that the patient complaint system (out of necessity) provides a 
reactive, service user-led mechanism of professional accountability in which notions of due process, 
fairness and redress must be carefully balanced.15 Furthermore, the paper embeds its critical analysis 
of the MPT process in the context of the Law Commission’s comprehensive review of health care 
professionals conducted in 2014/15.16 This noted that MPTs are a vitally important legal mechanism 
for ensuring public trust in medical regulation when complaints are made about a doctor. As a result, 
Parliament acted to strengthen the investigatory and adjudication process by legislating to ensure that 
MPTs are independent autonomous structures within the GMC. The paper concludes by questioning if 
indeed this is the most appropriate approach to ensuring public protection.  
The next section of the paper details the background to this discussion by outlining how the MPT 
process operates and provides outcome data between 2006 and 2014, with data from previous years 
being discussed where possible.17 Although the data outlined illustrates the operation of the GMC, it 
should not however be taken as representative of its total activity for each calendar year. This is 
because in 2013 an enquiry took on average 97 weeks to move from the initial complaint to MPT 
outcome stage; hence an enquiry received in 2009 may well not reach resolution until 2011. This said, 
having year on year comparative data does allow for descriptive statistical trends to emerge.  
II. COMPLAINTS AND THE HEARING OF FITNESS TO PRACTISE CASES 
The GMC is responsible for removing doctors from the medical register. It is not part of the GMC’s 
role to encourage complaints against doctors. Nor does it respond to complaints against NHS 
systems (although it may respond to complaints against individuals that illustrate system failings) and 
                                            
see R. Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2004) Modern Law Review 67: 351-383; J.C. 
Donoghue, ‘Reforming the Role of Magistrates: Implications for Summary Justice in England and 
Wales’ (2014) Modern Law Review 77: 928 – 963), as well as the public sector more generally (for 
example, see C. Hood and P. Miller Risk and Public Services: Report by the ESRC Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation (London: The London School of Economics, 2010).  
15 P. de Prez, ‘Self-Regulation and Paragons of Virtue: The Case of Fitness to Practise’ (2002) 
Modern Law Review 10: 28 - 56. 
16 Regulation of Health Care Professionals, Regulation of Social Care Professionals in England Law 
Commission Consultation Paper No 202 (London: England, 2014); Regulation of Health Care 
Professionals, Regulation of Social Care Professionals in Northern Ireland Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No 12 (Belfast: Northern Ireland, 2014); Regulation of Health Care Professionals, 
Regulation of Social Care Professionals in Scotland Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 
153 (Edinburgh: Scotland, 2014). 
17 Contact was made with the GMC to discuss the availability of data, under the Freedom of 
Information Act (2000). It was stated that the GMC have only held fully computerised record systems 
since 2006 and that the resources which would need to be allocated to review stored paper files to 
obtain data prior to this date would exceed the appropriate limit of costs incurred under the Act. The 
GMC noted it was possible to obtain data on complaints for 1995, 1998 and between 1999 and 2014, 
as well as the hearing of fitness to practise cases for the years 2006 to 2014, from the following 
published reports: General Medical Council Annual Statistics (London: GMC 2000); General Medical 
Council Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2001); General Medical Council Annual Statistics (London: 
GMC, 2002); General Medical Council Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2003); General Medical 
Council Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2004); General Medical Council Annual Statistics (London: 
GMC, 2005); General Medical Council Fitness to Practise Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2006); 
General Medical Council Fitness to Practise Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2007); General Medical 
Council Fitness to Practise Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2008); General Medical Council Fitness 
to Practise Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2009); General Medical Council Fitness to Practise: 
Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 2010); General Medical Council Fitness to Practise: Annual 
Statistics (London: GMC, 2011); General Medical Council Fitness to Practise: Annual Statistics 
(London: GMC, 2012). General Medical Council Fitness to Practise: Annual Statistics (London: GMC, 
2013). General Medical Council Fitness to Practise Annual Statistics Report 2014 (London: GMC, 
2014). 
neither does it arrange for complainants to receive an apology, an explanation of what happened, or 
provide help and support for compensation claims.18 The GMC only responds to complaints that call 
into question a doctor's fitness to practise.19 Under Section 35C(2) of the Medical Act 1983, alongside 
the guidance to good practice provided in its document Good Medical Practice,20 the GMC focusses 
upon complaints that highlight instances where a doctor: has made serious or repeated mistakes in 
carrying out medical procedures or in diagnosis (for example, by prescribing drugs in a dangerous 
way); has not examined a patient properly or responded appropriately to their medical need; has 
committed fraud, dishonesty or serious breaches of a patient confidentiality; has received a criminal 
conviction; or has developed a physical and/or mental health issue.                                                                                                
All complaints made to the GMC are referred to initially as ‘enquiries’. In the 2015 Parliamentary 
Accountability Hearing, the GMC Chief Executive, Niall Dickson, reported that the GMC publishes 
within its statistical return all enquiries it receives, although it only investigates complaints which fall 
within its remit.21 As a result, the year-on-year enquiries outlined in Table One are regarded as the 
officially recorded total number received by the GMC, regardless of source.22 Fitness to practise 
procedures are divided into two key stages: investigation and adjudication.23 The purpose of the 
investigation stage is to make an assessment as to whether there is a need to refer an enquiry to the 
Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) for adjudication, via a MPT. During the investigative 
stage, a ‘triage’ process takes place, which involves making an initial decision as to whether or not to 
proceed with an enquiry. Some enquiries are clearly outside of the GMC’s remit.24 For example, an 
enquiry may not be concerned with an individual medical practitioner. If necessary, the GMC will refer 
the matter to the doctor’s employer so that local procedures can be used if necessary to respond to it. 
The GMC has a target of eight weeks for completion of local procedures cases. If the initial 
information points towards the existence of a criminal conviction, then the matter will be immediately 
referred to a MPT for adjudication. Before discussing adjudication cases, the paper will first highlight 
key statistical trends found in the initial complaint data.  
A. Number of enquiries made to the GMC over time 
The total number of enquiries received by the GMC between 1999 and 2014 are detailed in Table 
One. This Table also shows the number of enquiries received by the GMC in 1995 and in 1998. The 
figures for 1995 and 1998 were obtained from published GMC documents.25 Aside from 2006, when 
                                            
18 n 9 above. 
19 General Medical Council, Guidance on GMC’s Fitness to Practise Rule (London: GMC, 2004). 
20 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (London: GMC, 2013). 
21 Health Committee (2015) Oral evidence: 2015 Accountability Hearing with the General Medical 
Council, HC 846 Tuesday 6 January 2015 London: House of Commons,14 
22 The origin of enquiries is broken down by the GMC into four source categories. In the 2014-15 
reporting period, 65% of all enquiries came from the public, 12% from other doctors, 6% from a 
practitioner’s employer, and 17% from other sources (e.g. the police). These proportions changed 
little between 2010 and 2013, when the GMC first started to break down its reporting of the source of 
enquiries in this manner. The data outlined in this paper pertains to all enquiries and how they 
progress through the GMC complaint handling system regardless of source, as year-on-year 
comparative outcome data broken down by complaint source was not available for the entirety of the 
reporting period detailed in tables one to four. The GMC noted in 2014-15 annual report that the 
number of enquiries it receives from doctors and employers has risen slightly over the last decade 
and the introduction of the new NHS duty of candour might well lead to a significant increase in 
enquires from NHS staff and employers in the future. It is expected that this will be examined further 
in future annual reports. Source: GMC (2015) The State of Medical Education and Practice in the UK 
2014-15 London: GMC. 
23 General Medical Council, Fitness to Practise Procedures (London: GMC, 2014). 
24 Enquiries which are clearly outside of the GMCs remit and do not enter the investigative stage are 
referred to as ‘stream two’ enquiries and are discontinued with no further action. Table Two details the 
number of enquiries concluded at this stage. 
25 n 17 above. 
the number of enquiries reduced sharply, the figures reveal that the number of enquiries received by 
the GMC has increased by 640 per cent over the last seventeen years, from 1503 in 1995 to 9624 in 
2014. The total of 9624 enquiries represents four per cent of all medical practitioners on the GMC 
register in 2014 (267,177).26 Although the GMC did change to a fully computerised record system in 
2006, the dip in enquiries that year cannot be attributed to any major change in the organisation or 
role of the GMC, so it may well be simply a statistical aberration, which can routinely occur in the 
analysis of longitudinal data. Furthermore, its presence does little to alter the significance of the 
longitudinal trend for increased enquiries, albeit with the proviso that the number appears to have 
tailed off over the last two years. In the last two decades there has been an increase in the 
questioning of medical authority, with the result that individuals are more likely to complain about their 
doctor and/or the treatment that they have received.27 A 2014 report by Civitas noted that the number 
of doctors on the medical register being complained about had risen from 0.9 in 1992 to 4 per cent in 
2012, with an increased willingness on behalf of the public to complain about the treatment they 
received underpinning this trend.28   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
B. Investigatory stage outcomes 
Having examined the total number of enquiries made, it is now necessary to consider the figures 
relating to the progression of cases from the investigation and adjudication stages. In those instances 
where the triage process confirms that the enquiry requires further consideration, it will proceed to the 
investigative stage. At this point, the complaint is discussed with the doctor in question as well as their 
employer29, in order to ensure that a complete picture of their practice can be obtained. All cases are 
overseen by two case examiners, one of whom is a non-medical practitioner and one is a medical 
practitioner. Witness statements and supportive material will be collected and analysed, including 
copies of patient medical records or other formal documentary material (for example, employer 
reports). Where there is a concern with performance or health, appropriate tests will be completed at 
this stage and an Interim Orders Tribunal (IOT) may be held. This may decide to suspend or restrict a 
doctor’s practice while the investigation continues. The investigation period concludes with either no 
further action being taken, the issuing of a warning, a practitioner agreeing to what are referred to as 
‘undertakings’ (i.e. training in clinical or communication skills), or a case being referred to a MPT for 
adjudication. On average, enquiries take twenty-nine weeks to move from the initial complaint to 
investigation outcome stage.30   
It was impossible to identify comparative outcome figures for the handling of enquiries at the 
investigative and adjudication stages prior to 2006 from the data available, as the process by which 
the GMC handles enquiries changed at this time as a consequence of broader reforms introduced 
following the Shipman case.31 Additionally, some information was unavailable as it was not present in 
the GMC reports used to obtain data.32 Moreover, in view of the time taken for a case to reach 
completion, GMC outcomes generally tend to roll forward to the following reporting period. 
Nonetheless, the available data for 2006 to 2014, as displayed in Table Two, does reveal a key trend 
towards an increased investigative workload (from 12 per cent, n = 346 in 2006, to 25 per cent, n = 
                                            
26 n 3 above. 
27 J. Archer, Understanding the Rise in Fitness to Practise Complaints from the Public (Plymouth: 
Plymouth Medical School, 2014). 
28 H. Williams, C Lees and M Boyd, The GMC: Fit to Practise? (London: Institute for the Study of Civil 
Society, 2014) 
29 Doctors can be self-employed, for example if they have entered private practice. In these 
circumstances, the GMC will contact a practitioner’s practice partners.  
30 Professional Standards Authority, Performance Review Report 2013-14 (London: Professional 
Standards Authority, 2014). 
31 n 30 above. 
32 See n 17 above 
2444 in 2014) and the greater use of pre-emptive action in the case management of enquiries. 
Although the majority of enquiry cases are concluded before the investigatory stage by the GMC (as 
they are deemed to have not met the aforementioned criteria under which it operates), just as more 
complaints are being made than previously, more doctors are being subject to formal and informal 
sanction before being subject to a formal disciplinary hearing. Table Two suggests that the GMC is 
making relatively frequent use of warnings and rehabilitative undertakings, in addition to providing 
individual doctors (and their employers) with informal advice and guidance. It should be noted here, 
however, that in 2012 the GMC changed how it issued advice, as it was felt that such action should 
be devolved to a local NHS Trust level in the majority of cases, and this is reflected in a significant 
reduction in instances of its use in 2013. The validity of the conclusion that there has been a rise in 
investigatory action as well as pre-emptive disciplinary ‘holding measures’ as part of this process, is 
arguably further substantiated by Table Three. This displays the use of interim orders to suspend or 
restrict the practice of doctors before a formal tribunal hearing takes place. It is evident from this data 
that the process is seeking to either restrict a doctor’s professional practice while they are under 
investigation, or to suspend them completely. The trend towards pre-emptive action will be returned to 
again in the next section of this paper, where the use of disciplinary measures will be explored further 
in relation to notions of due process and procedural fairness. However, attention will first be paid to 
detailing trends in MPT hearing outcomes. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
C. Fitness to practise tribunal outcomes 
The adjudication stage involves a formal hearing of a case by the MPTS via a MPT.  Hearings consist 
of a mixture of medical and non-medical lay members. The format is adversarial, with the GMC’s legal 
representative presenting evidence and argument in the public interest, and a practitioner’s legal 
representative similarly presenting their own argument and evidence.33 If necessary, MPT members 
will be advised by a specialist health and/or performance adviser. There are five main outcomes of a 
hearing: no further action; issuing a doctor with a formal warning; placing restrictions upon a doctor’s 
professional practice (for example, imposing supervision or requiring the doctor to undertake further 
training); suspending a doctor from the medical register so that they may not practise for a given 
period of time; and erasing a doctor from the medical register. A doctor has twenty-eight days to 
appeal against a decision which they lodge at the High Court of Justice in England and Wales, the 
Court of Session in Scotland, or the High Court of Justice of Northern Ireland. The panel’s decision 
will not take effect until either the appeal period expires or the appeal is determined. However, the 
panel can impose an immediate order of suspension or conditions on practice, if it believes that this is 
necessary to protect the public or is in the best interests of the doctor. It is the intention of the GMC 
that when they erase a doctor from the medical register, that this ought ordinarily to be for life. On 
average, enquiries generally take ninety-seven weeks to move from the initial complaint to an 
outcome.34  
Table Four details the outcomes of cases heard at the adjudication stage. For year on year 
comparative purposes, the data has been broken down into relative percentages for each action 
category based on the total number of cases heard per year. This shows that although there is (as 
                                            
33 For cost reasons, some doctors choose to represent themselves at hearings (14% in 2015 and 13% 
in 2014). In such circumstances, the MPTS advises practitioners to, if possible, obtain free legal 
assistance from the Medical Defence Union. The impact (if any) of self-representation on hearing 
outcomes during the 2006 – 2014 reporting period detailed in this paper is not known (Source: 
Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service, Report of the Chair of the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service 
(London, Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service, 2015)).  
34 n 30 above. 
would be expected) a degree of fluctuation in the year on year percentages within each case disposal 
pathway, overall there is a strong element of comparative consistency, both between and within the 
different action categories, in how fitness to practise cases were managed throughout the time period 
2006 to 2014. This time period has been accompanied by a growing public concern about medical 
error and malpractice, alongside an increasing perception within the medical profession at large that 
the GMC is adopting a more punitive approach to the management of fitness to practise cases.35  In 
this regard, Table Four illustrates that the adjudication stage is more likely to result in high impact 
decisions, such as conditions being placed on a doctor’s practice, suspension from the medical 
register, or erasure from the medical register. Relatively few doctors receive undertakings or warnings 
at adjudication stage, although a considerable percentage of cases result in the conclusion that there 
is no impairment in a doctor’s practice. Furthermore, the shift to a civil standard of proof during this 
time period (i.e. from 2008 onwards) does not appear to have resulted in an immediate and significant 
increase in doctors being erased from the medical register. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
III. DISCUSSION 
The preceding section of this paper has highlighted several key themes. First, that there has been an 
upward trend in the GMC receiving complaints over the last two decades, rising by 640 per cent from 
1503 in 1995 to 9624 in 2014, with the proportion of doctors on the medical register being complained 
about increasing from 0.9 per cent in 1992 to 4 per cent in 2014. Second, that the GMC is 
investigating more complaints, with the number of complaints taken forward for investigation after the 
initial triage process in the last decade doubling from 12 per cent (n = 346) in 2006, to 25 per cent (n 
= 2442) in 2014. Third, this increase in GMC workload has led to more doctors being subject to pre-
emptive formal and informal ‘holding sanctions’ before being subject to a MPT hearing, with the GMC 
making relatively frequent use of its powers to suspend or restrict a doctor’s practice in addition to 
issuing warnings and agreeing rehabilitative undertakings, as well as providing individual doctors (and 
their employers) with informal advice and guidance. Fourth, in relation to MPT outcomes, although 
there is a degree of fluctuation in the year on year percentages within each case disposal pathway, 
overall there is a strong element of comparative consistency, both between and within the different 
action outcome categories. Fifth, the tribunal adjudication stage is more likely to result in high impact 
punitive decisions, such as conditions being placed on a doctor’s practice, suspension from the 
medical register, or erasure from the medical register; however a proportion of cases do result in the 
conclusion that there was no impairment in a doctor’s practice. Sixth, the shift to a civil standard of 
proof during this time period (i.e. from 2008 onwards) does not appear to have resulted in an 
immediate and significant increase in doctors being erased from the medical register. The paper will 
now turn to discuss and reflect upon these findings in turn. 
A. Complaints and reforming the GMC 
The rising number of complaints to the GMC over the last two decades and the concomitant increase 
in enquiry case workload is well recognised within the academic literature.36 Analysis of the GMC’s 
statistical data has established that the rise in complaints from members of the public has been 
largely consistent at regional and national levels throughout the UK, suggesting that the increase has 
been driven by wider social trends rather than localised factors.37 It is therefore important to pay 
attention to those broader societal trends which may assist in accounting for these developments. In 
particular, Griffiths and Sanders note the increasingly litigious nature of modern societies, which is 
associated with greater willingness and confidence on the part of individuals to seek legal redress 
                                            
35 n 27 above. 
36 P. Case, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Dishonest Doctor: the General Medical Council and the 
Redemption Model of Fitness to Practise’ (2011) Legal Studies 31: 591- 614. 
37 n 27 above 
(against businesses, institutions and private citizens) and obtain compensation. In this context, the 
rise in complaints against doctors may well be a consequence of the fact that increasing numbers of 
the public are seeking legal/financial redress when they are not satisfied with the medical treatment 
they receive.38  
However, it is equally important to bear in mind that complainants are often motivated by strong 
emotions, such as anger, frustration and the grief of losing a loved one, and research suggests that 
as a result they often act out of an altruistic sense of social justice, seeing it as their personal duty to 
ensure that the poor care that they feel that they or their relatives have experienced does not happen 
to other people in future.39 As a result, the fact that the majority of complaints the GMC receives are 
not taken forward (75% in 2014) raises questions surrounding its gatekeeper role when it comes to 
ensuring patients can seek satisfactory non-financial altruistic forms of redress, which the paper will 
return to later. For the moment, it is enough to note that there is considerable confusion surrounding 
the wider system of complaint-handling in place in the NHS.40 The handling of complaints is divided 
between professional regulatory bodies, which focus on individuals’ practice, systems regulators such 
as the Care Quality Commission, as well as healthcare providers and the health services 
ombudsmen. This suggests that it might well be difficult for members of the public to know where to 
address their complaints, and that this confusion may be driving people towards directing their 
complaints to long-standing organisations such as the GMC, as it may be more recognisable. 
Furthermore, as Brazier and Ost note, because national-level professional regulatory bodies such as 
the GMC may be viewed as more independent than local NHS employers, complainants may contact 
them as well as the police, rather than complaining to the service where they suffered a negative 
experience.41  
In recent years the public profile of the medical profession and the GMC has been damaged by 
negative media coverage, focussed on the supposed failings of foreign doctors, stories of criminality, 
as well as high-profile fitness to practise cases.42 Equally however, recent legislative reform in the 
regulation of doctors, which has similarly been widely reported in the media, has supported the 
development of a risk-based model of professional governance and this has inculcated fundamental 
changes in the public-facing organisational structure of the GMC.43 At present, the GMC undoubtedly 
looks like a very different organisation from what it was previously.44  No longer is it the public symbol 
of medical authority, status and power. The traditional doctors-only ‘club mentality’ has shifted to 
permit the inclusion of non-medical members, and it now possesses open and transparent 
administrative protocols, processes and outcome measures, from which its operational performance 
can be observed, measured and judged.45 The rise in complaints received – regardless of whether 
they are suitable for GMC action or not - might well be a reflection of this change.   
In the past, as a result of high profile scandals, the GMC has been accused of bias towards doctors 
and has been criticised for not fulfilling its statutory obligation under s.1A and s.1B of the Medical Act 
1983, to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and well-being of the public. As a result, it 
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has sought to become more transparent in its operations.46 In this context, ‘transparency’ can be 
understood as a policy device designed to enable practices that are open to public scrutiny in order to 
generate greater trust and legitimacy.47 The accumulation of regulatory failures in the last three 
decades prompted the government to legislate for a shift from ‘professional self-regulation’ to 
‘regulated self-regulation’ whereby GMC activity is made more transparent through being subject to 
independent regulatory oversight by the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE), which 
since 2012 has been called the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (PSA).48 
The noted proportional rise in complaints taken forward for investigation in the last decade (rising from 
12 per cent (n = 346) in 2006, to 25 per cent (n = 2442) in 2014), along with the proactive use of pre-
emptive formal and informal ‘holding sanctions’ before a MPT hearing, arguably provide some 
evidence to support the conclusion that regulatory reform has led to a shift from protecting doctors, 
towards protecting the public. Nonetheless, pertinent questions persist concerning the legitimacy of 
the tribunal process. 
B. The process as punishment and procedural fairness 
There is a growing perception within the medical profession that the GMC itself is far less tolerant of 
infractions than before.49 The data outlined in this paper lends support to the argument that the GMC 
is making relatively frequent use of IOTs to suspend or restrict a doctor’s practice, in addition to 
issuing warnings and agreeing rehabilitative undertakings, as well as providing individual doctors (and 
their employers) with informal advice and guidance. Published research reporting the experiences of 
nearly eight thousand doctors found that those who had recently been the subject of a complaint were 
twice as likely as other doctors to report moderate or severe anxiety, and twice as likely to have 
thoughts of self-harm. Those referred to the GMC had especially high rates of psychological illness, 
with twenty-six per cent reporting moderate to severe depression and twenty two per cent reporting 
moderate to severe anxiety.50 It has been suggested that pre-hearing investigative measures are 
traumatising for doctors who suffer from health-related problems in particular, and in some instances 
this is leading them to agree to high impact sanctions, namely suspension or erasure from the 
medical register, before they attend a hearing, with the hearing itself subsequently becoming a ‘rubber 
stamp’ exercise.51 The caveat must be added that the available research does not differentiate 
between tribunal cases where a practitioner has contested or where they have not contested the 
accusations made against them. Nonetheless one hundred and fourteen doctors died while facing a 
fitness to practise investigation between 2005 and 2013. Twenty-four of whom committed suicide, 
with a further four being suspected of doing so.52 Such findings raise legitimate questions in regards 
to the potentially overly punitive nature of the process.  
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It is important that the tribunal process does not become primarily focused upon ‘punishment for 
punishment’s sake’ as a consequence of a risk-averse drive towards increased medical accountability 
and institutional transparency.53  An apposite comparative example of why the punitive dimensions of 
the tribunal process must be carefully considered is to be found in Malcolm Feeley’s socio-legal study 
of lower criminal courts, The Process is the Punishment.54 Feeley highlighted that in some instances, 
due process procedural safeguards designed to preserve the right to trial by jury were undermined by 
the severity of pre-trial procedures (e.g. the economic costs associated with paying bail bondsmen or 
retaining counsel). He noted that these frequently served the function of punishing the defendant, with 
court actors other than the judge and jury, such as bail bondsmen, possessing a key role in the 
administration of punishment, as they often incentivised the defendant to plead guilty.  
In the context of the hearing of fitness to practise cases, the evidence published in this paper and 
elsewhere in relation to the impact of the pre-hearing process on doctors increasingly highlights 
broader concerns for medical-legal scholars regarding procedural fairness within the medical tribunal 
process. Research suggests that both patients and medical practitioners report high levels of 
dissatisfaction with how the GMC responds to complaints.55 Given the naturally competing interests of 
both parties, this is somewhat to be expected. However, the fitness to practise hearing is the only 
mechanism for providing fairness in procedure, and for achieving a balance between the competing 
interests of parties to ensure greater satisfaction with the tribunal process. Therefore, it is the process 
itself which is of principal importance in determining whether procedural fairness has been achieved 
and appropriate punishment delivered – and not the individual outcome of a given case.56 In addition, 
procedural justice scholars have observed that an individual’s experience of the process strongly 
influences the perceived fairness of the substantive result of a legal process.57 As a result, legislative 
reformers ought not to identify a numeric increase in enquiries about doctors being investigated and 
called to account for their actions as a key measure from which to judge their success or otherwise in 
reforming medical regulation. Instead, greater attention should be paid to examining whether doctors, 
patients and their respective legal representatives, report greater satisfaction with the case hearing 
process, even when the hearing outcome does not find in their favour. Such an endeavour would be 
useful in generating better understanding of conceptions of fair treatment, impartiality and equity, 
within the domain of fitness to practise hearings.58 This paper will now examine this matter in the 
context of findings relating to the impact of the shift toward the civil standard, considering as it does 
so the risk-focused nature of the broader regulatory reform agenda, as well as recent legislative 
reforms to the tribunal process.  
C. The shift to the civil standard and rise of risk-based medical regulation 
Thus far I have highlighted the presence of possible problems with the procedural fairness of the 
complaint and tribunal process from the point of view of doctors, noting how the data outlined lends 
support to the view that recent regulatory reform has heralded a ‘punitive turn’ in how practitioners are 
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treated by the GMC.59 Moreover, it has been noted that although there has been a rise in the 
workload of the GMC, its gatekeeper role at each point in the complaint decision making and follow-
up process arguably remains problematic, at least from the point of view of patients. It is pertinent to 
remember here that complaints from patients are less likely than those from an NHS employer or 
fellow practitioner, to proceed to case investigation and lead to action being taken against a doctor.60 
Indeed, although its prominent profile in the eyes of the public means that the GMC will always attract 
complaints which lie outside of its remit, the 2006-2014 data outlined in Table Two show that the 
majority of complaints it receives do not make it past the triage stage (e.g. seventy-five per cent in 
2014). This is in spite of the fact that the little independent research which exists on the GMC 
management of complaints has in the past revealed the apparent presence of judgemental bias.61 A 
more recent small-scale independent review of a sample of complaints found that: ‘articulate 
individuals who present their complaints clearly and in detail are more likely to have their cases taken 
up by the GMC.62 Similarly, the PSA’s predecessor stated in light of their 2010 audit of GMC 
operations that: ‘We consider that it [the GMC] needs to ensure that its decision makers have fully 
understood all the complainant’s concerns, and that complainants feel that they are encouraged to 
submit a complaint.’63 With this in mind, I would contend that the consistency of the hearing 
judgements and the lack of impact resulting from the shift to the civil standard highlight important 
issues regarding the use of risk-based regulatory principles within medical regulation, which 
furthermore are highly salient given recent governmental reforms to the tribunal process. 
In her review of the GMC and its response to complaints, Dame Janet Smith, Chair of the Shipman 
inquiry, concluded that it was guilty of protecting the interests of doctors rather than patients.64 The 
figures presented in this paper pertaining to the handling of enquiries by the GMC provide a basis 
upon which to analyse its administrative operational procedures in order to identify if, and how far, a 
cultural change in the organisation has occurred since Smith’s 2005 report. The statistical data 
outlined confirms that focusing longitudinally on the management of enquiries and MPT outcomes is a 
valuable tool for assessing the impact of regulatory reform on the day to day operation of the GMC. 
As previously discussed, evidence exists that there has been a change in the operational culture of 
the GMC as it is increasingly acting informally to provide advice, give warnings and agree 
rehabilitative forms of action with doctors, as well as more formally to subject doctors to rehabilitative 
and disciplinary action. Nonetheless, the shift in the level of evidence required to meet the realistic 
prospect test 65 does not appear to have resulted in significantly more doctors being struck off the 
medical register. Yet it is the consistency of the outcome categories which arguably is most important. 
Comparing the year on year data reveals that even though the number of enquiries has risen by 640 
per cent over the last seventeen years, the GMC has adopted a relatively consistent administrative 
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approach towards the management of cases in terms of the disposal pathway by which they typically 
progress. Importantly, this finding is congruent with the view that the organisational change underway 
within the GMC is underpinned by a growing reliance on formulised ‘risk templates’ to aid decision-
making processes. 
It has been observed in the context of the governance of the health and social welfare professions 
that we live in ‘the age of risk-based regulation’.66 Risk-based approaches supporting a regulatory 
shift from ‘front-line professional regulator’67 to ‘regulated self-regulation’ are apparent in the UK 
across the health and social care professions.68 Indeed, as previously discussed, GMC activity is now 
subject to oversight from the PSA and a key function of this is to promote a ‘risk-averse’ working 
culture of transparency and professional accountability.69 Key to the development of a risk-based 
approach to regulation is the collection and sharing of performance data to support institutional 
transformation and third-party audit and review. This is achieved through the proactive use of 
outcome data to establish clear performance standards and best-evidenced protocols and guidelines 
to inform decision-making processes in order to monitor organisational performance and ensure 
regulatory standards are being maintained70. In this context, therefore, outcome data becomes one of 
medicine’s new ‘visible markers of trust [which as]…tools of bureaucratic regulation fulfil [a] function 
as signifiers of quality’.71  
The statistical data detailed in this paper provide supporting evidence that an organisational and 
cultural shift towards a risk-averse regulatory model has occurred as the GMC has been reformed in 
order to regain public trust in its decision making processes.72 Rather than being a clearly defined 
method, risk-based regulation is best conceived of as a cluster of tools which provide rules for action 
and in doing so serve to constrain what action can be recorded in the first place. A computer system 
called Siebel is used to manage the enquiry process: 
Siebel’s pre-defined decision codes are expressed as the legal rule or section that has been 
applied….Where identification of risks is concerned, the coding of allegations is crucial. The 
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allegation codes used in Siebel are designed, not to capture what is alleged, but rather to 
define a potential case within the GMC’s powers.73  
In its published reports, the GMC advocates a risk-based model of regulation and the use of the 
Siebel computer system to oversee a relatively consistent administrative approach in responding to 
enquiries over time (in terms of the disposal pathway by which cases typically progress, as illustrated 
in Table Four). This exemplifies a growing organisational reliance upon codified risk-averse 
procedural rules to assist in the day to day processing of enquiries.74 Risk-based regulation relies 
heavily on seemingly objective decision-making processes whereby codified forms of knowledge are 
used to prescribe performance targets and best-evidenced judgemental norms surrounding what 
constitutes appropriate action in a given situation.75 As such, these mechanisms allow the GMC to 
rhetorically reaffirm the primacy of patient treatment and care in the face of previous high profile 
instances of medical malpractice and criminality.76 Yet there is a danger that this approach may, over 
time, undermine the broader professional practice community, with its preference for strong forms of 
discretion in professional decision-making, as they become ever more wary of the GMC and its 
associated bureaucratic machinery,77  
In her discussion of how the courts respond to alleged acts of medical criminality, Quirk observes that 
the inherently risky nature of modern medicine means that well-intentioned attempts to promote 
greater certainty in clinical decision making and professional practice must remain mindful of the 
possibility that they could engender unintended negative consequences for doctors and patients.78 
For example, research has reported that doctors are increasingly admitting to practicing medicine 
more ‘defensively’ as a result of being investigated or witnessing the impact of investigations on 
colleagues.79 One large-scale study revealed that eighty-four per cent of doctors reported ‘hedging’ 
(overcautious practice such as overprescribing, referring too many patients, or ordering unnecessary 
tests) and forty-six per cent reported ‘avoidance’ (reluctance to take on difficult patients or 
procedures).80 This raises serious questions about the impact of complaints processes on patient 
care. Over prescribing or referral and avoiding complex patients or difficult operations because of a 
fear of complaints or the actions of the GMC is clearly not in the interests of patients, and may 
increase costs to the NHS. As a result, pertinent questions exist surrounding the role of the GMC and 
the impact of risk-based regulation on the continued legitimacy of the hearing process. In this context, 
precisely how can further regulatory reform provide a structure that is transparent, fair and enables 
the confidence of all parties? 
D. The Law Commission review: a progressive development? 
To determine an appropriate answer to this question, the Law Commission began a consultation 
exercise in 2012 to reform the complaint and tribunal process in order to establish areas for further 
regulatory reform, particularly in relation to the GMC responses to enquiries.81 At the same time, the 
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GMC established the MPTS to assume responsibility for the adjudication of cases.82 This is not the 
first time that the GMC has acted pre-emptively to reform its internal organisation in the face of 
governmental consultation in relation to reforming its statutory powers.83 At the centre of the Law 
Commission consultation sat the need to address the contentious issue that the GMC was 
responsible for both the investigation and the adjudication of allegations of impaired fitness to 
practise.84 As arbiters of standards and prosecutor decision-making, the GMC’s independence as 
adjudicator acting in the public interest is arguably tenuous and open to question. Two potential 
solutions were examined: the creation of an independent body to oversee adjudication and for the 
GMC to solely be concerned with investigation before passing cases on to this body, or for the MPTS 
to become a strengthened and independent arm of the GMC responsible for adjudication. In both 
instances, the PSA would retain the right to refer MPT outcomes to the High Court under section 29 of 
the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002.  
Parliament endorsed the second of these proposals in 2015, legislating a section 60 order 85 to 
amend the Medical Act 1983 and establish internal structural mechanisms within the GMC to ensure a 
greater degree of separation, with the MPTS becoming a clearly distinctive and autonomous 
organisation responsible for case adjudication.86 Additionally, the GMC now possesses the right to 
appeal a MPT case decision to the High Court of Justice in England and Wales, the Court of Session 
in Scotland, or the High Court of Justice of Northern Ireland. It was originally argued by the Law 
Commission that the: ‘General Medical Council’s proposed right of appeal is both a consequence of, 
and reinforces, the independence of the new Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service’.87 This right of 
appeal will be used when a sanction is considered to be unduly lenient or, in relation to a decision not 
to take any disciplinary action or restore a person to the register, that the decision should not have 
been made.88 The intention behind establishing an ‘in house’ quasi-independent MPTS within the 
GMC’s organisational structure was to remove the unsatisfactory situation of it acting as ‘judge and 
jury’ in fitness to practise cases.89 This approach is held to be the most appropriate solution in view of 
concerns expressed within the medical profession and government, with regards to the utility of 
adopting alternative more costly approaches given the self-funding nature of the GMC and the highly 
specialised nature of medical expertise.90 Furthermore, the decision to embed within statutory 
legislation the right of the GMC to appeal MPTS decisions, in addition to the right of the PSA to 
appeal decisions in a similar fashion, adds a ‘double layer’ of regulatory oversight to the MPT 
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outcome process and reflects the emphasis placed by risk-averse regulatory models on minimising 
the possibility of harm.91  
Although these changes are undoubtedly progressive, arguably they do not go far enough to address 
the conflict of interest in the GMC role which continues to exist in spite of recent regulatory reform. 
Questions remain not only about the adjudication process, but also about the GMC’s gatekeeper role 
at each point in the decision making and follow-up process. A significant number of enquiries continue 
to fail to make it past the initial triage and investigative stages.92 An additional cause for concern is 
that there is currently little by way of independent reassurance that the GMC case management 
system operates without bias.93 Furthermore, embedding the MPTS within the structure of the GMC, 
(albeit as a devolved entity rather than acting legislatively to ensure its full independence), suggests 
that matters of economic efficiency and practical expediency may have taken precedence over public 
interest.94 In this regard, it is worth noting that although the PSA reviews all decisions of the MPTS 
which have not resulted in erasure, it only forwarded four such cases in 2005, six in 2006, none in 
2007, one in 2008, one in 2009, two in 2010, one in 2011, none in 2012, one in 2013, four in 2014 
and one in 2015.95  
The small number of referrals might suggest an increasingly rigorous stance on behalf of the GMC 
towards fitness to practise cases, at least since its decisions became subject to oversight by the PSA. 
But equally, they could be said to reinforce that doubts exist about the ability of PSA risk-based audit 
processes to secure the public interest.96 Why, therefore, should the proposal to give the GMC the 
right to appeal decisions by the MPTS lead to a different set of outcomes? Would an independent 
scrutiny panel, with specialist input from health NGOs and patient-interest groups alongside 
professional medical and legal bodies, not be better suited to the task? Finally, it is important to 
consider the language in use here within the context of matters of due process and procedural 
fairness. Doctors who are subject to MPTS proceedings have the right to expect a fair hearing. 
Focussing on legislating for the right of regulatory bodies to appeal decisions made in tribunal as a 
result of the adversarial process, is indicative of a process which is becoming overly politicised and 
unduly weighted towards the pursuit of punishment, rather than retaining a necessary emphasis on 
balancing notions of fairness with redress.97 As a result, at this moment in time, recent legislative 
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developments appear to represent a missed opportunity to more fully address key systemic concerns 
surrounding the regulation of doctors in the UK.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is a common contention of medical elites, as well as those within academic circles, that the 
organisational structure and culture of the GMC is changing, resulting in more doctors being subject 
to investigatory and disciplinary procedures. This paper has detailed longitudinally GMC enquiry and 
MPT outcome data which supports this view. Nonetheless, it is not possible at present to conclude 
that the risk-based legislative shift from ‘professional self-regulation’ to ‘regulated self-regulation’ 
better protects the public interest while maintaining legal due process and procedural fairness.98 The 
recent Law Commission comprehensive review of health care professionals noted that MPTs are a 
vitally important legal mechanism for ensuring that public trust in medical regulation is maintained 
when complaints are made about a doctor. In doing so, it acted to strengthen the investigatory and 
adjudication process by legislating to ensure that they are independent autonomous structures of the 
GMC.99 Yet it is pertinent to remember that we have been here before. The Health and Social Care 
Act 2008 established the Office of Health Professions Adjudicator (OHPA) to take over the role of the 
GMC in the adjudication of fitness to practise cases. The intended objective of this change was to 
enhance impartiality and the independence of the fitness to practise hearing process within the Health 
Care Professions.100 The OHPA became a legal entity in January 2010. Yet in the summer of 2010 
the UK government concluded that it was not persuaded of the need to introduce another regulatory 
body to fulfil the role of adjudicator in fitness to practise cases.101 In part, this decision was made in 
light of the stringent economic realities faced by public services in the UK as the government sought 
to respond to the financial realities of the 2008 global financial crisis.102 But it was also a reflection of 
the extent to which medical elites, notably the Royal Colleges, had successfully persuaded 
government that they had managed to subject rank and file practitioners to greater peer surveillance 
and control.103 This may well be true, but there remains a very real danger that legal reforms have 
been introduced to the MPT process for reasons which may unintentionally serve to undermine the 
principles of swift, proportionate and effective legal response(s) to ensure public protection in 
particular types of cases.104 
This proposition is particularly prescient in light of the highly politicised nature of the legal regulation of 
doctors more generally, and given that the patient complaint system (out of necessity) provides a 
reactive, user-led mechanism of professional accountability in which notions of due process, fairness 
and redress must be carefully balanced.105 It must, therefore, remain a strategic priority for 
government when it intervenes in medical regulation with reforming intentions, to ensure that the 
legislative system it enacts is equitable and fit for purpose. Given these considerations, it is imperative 
that medical and legal scholars continue to pay close critical attention to the evolving nature of 
legislative developments pertaining to the regulation of medical practitioners, particularly in relation to 
the consequences of reform for the independence of the fitness to practise tribunal process to ensure 
procedural fairness. The establishment of the MPTS as an autonomous entity within the organisation 
of the GMC seeks to balance state concerns over cost and patient anxiety over safety and 
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accountability, with a legitimate professional concern for maintaining a necessary element of strong 
discretion within professional regulatory frameworks. Only time will tell if this is indeed a viable 
alternative to the creation of a separate legislative body undertaking case hearing and adjudication. 
Whatever happens next in the development of the GMC and how it responds to cases that raise 
concern about a doctor’s fitness to practise, the shift towards risk-averse forms of professional 
accountability must not sacrifice due process in the name of political pragmatic exigency. 
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Table 2: Breakdown of GMC Investigatory Action outcomes (2006 – 2014) 










to MPT  
2006 2788 2442 346 (12%) Not available  86 44 216 
2007 4118 3722 396  Not available  159 40 196 
2008 4166 3530 636 Not available  168 109 359 
2009 5773 4015 1758  428 212 95 319 
2010 7153 5087 2066  458 183 102 314 
2011 8781 6451 2330  736 199 148 212 
2012 10347 7639 2708  844 182 143 216 
2013 9,866 7399 2467  208 152 173 258 
2014 9,624 7180 2444 (25%) 267 110 136 218 
Table 3 Interim Orders Tribunal outcomes 
Year Suspension Conditions 
2006 104 Not available 
2007 152 Not available 
2008 132 Not available 
2009 156 Not available 
2010 144 214 
2011 158 236 
2012 207 336 
2013 125 375 
2014 127 374 





































































– no action 






 – no action 
47 21% 36 14% 28 14% 44 16% 65 20% 33 14% 48 23% 39 17% 37 16% 
Voluntary  
Erasure 
3 1% 2 1% 0 0% 3 1% 7 2% 1 >0.5
% 
2 1% 4 2% 4 2% 




0 0% 3 1% 
Reprimand 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Warning 14 6% 8 3% 22 11% 22 8% 29 9% 23 10% 12 6% 13 6% 10 4% 
Conditions 38 17% 55 21% 30 15% 48 18% 37 11% 24 10% 20 10% 32 14% 22 10% 
Suspension 69 31% 78 30% 75 37% 77 29% 106 33% 93 38% 64 31% 86 37% 86 36% 
Erasure 37 17% 60 23% 42 20% 68 25% 73 22% 65 27% 55 26% 55 24% 71 29% 
 
